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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
IMPACT OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET AFTER 1992
F. G. Jacobs*
The Single European Act, by its amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, seeks to achieve by the
end of 1992 an internal market comprising an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. To
this end, a very substantial amount of new legislation is being enacted
in the form of Council Regulations and Directives, currently estimated
at some 279 separate measures, many of which will also need implementing legislation in the Member States.
The origins of the Single European Act can be traced to an initiative of the European Parliament, an initiative which in turn is generally attributed to the idea of an Italian Member, the late Altiero
Spinelli. Under his chairmanship, the Institutional Committee of the
European Parliament prepared a draft Treaty on European Union,
which was adopted by the Parliament in February, 1984.1 Although
the draft did not enter into force, some of its themes were taken up in
the Single European Act. A further impetus was provided by the
Commission, which in January, 1985, proposed realizing the objective
of a market without internal frontiers by the end of 1992.2 The detailed measures for the removal of physical, technical, and fiscal barriers were set out in a White Paper, which specified the program,
timetable and methods for creating a unified economic area in which
persons, goods, services and capital would be able to move freely. The
Commission's proposal partly reflected the central themes of the Parliament's draft Treaty, which included the attainment of the internal
market and the institutional reforms considered necessary for that
* Advocate Gefieral, Court of Justice of the European Communities. (Revised text of the
William W. Bishop Lecture in international law delivered at the University of Michigan on September 7, 1989)
1. See F. CAPOTORTI, M. HILF, F. JACOBS & J. JACQUf, THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY
(1986).
2. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission, 1985 COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES DOCUMENTS, COM (85) 310 final.
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purpose. The proposed reforms included majority voting in the Council in areas where the EEC Treaty still required unanimity, and greater
powers for the European Parliament itself in order to make the Community's legislative process more democratic. In all of these areas, the
Single European Act introduced, as I shall suggest, significant amendments to the EEC Treaty.
In addition, the Single European Act made other amendments to
the Treaty. Among other things, it introduced into the EEC Treaty a
new chapter entitled "Co-operation in Economic and Monetary Policy
(Economic and Monetary Union);" new provisions on social policy; a
new title, "Economic and Social Cohesion," providing for a more developed regional policy; a new title "Research and Technological Development;" and a further new title "Environment." These additions
to the Treaty represented virtually the first substantive amendments,
the earlier Treaty amendments being essentially of an institutional and
budgetary character. Other innovations, not involving amendments to
the EEC Treaty itself, included the provision, for the first time, of a
treaty basis for the co-ordination of the foreign policy of the Member
States.
Finally, the Single European Act introduced significait institutional innovations affecting the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the Community. It introduced a wider use of the majority vote in the Council, thus facilitating, in areas central to the single
market, the adoption of the necessary Community legislation. It enlarged, in many areas, the role of the European Parliament in the
adoption of Community legislation. It created the possibility of conferring wider implementing powers on the Commission. And it made
possible the establishment of a new judicial organ, the European Court
of First Instance.
In certain fundamental respects, the constitutional foundations of
the Community remain unaffected by the Single European Act. The
basic principles of the "direct effect" or self-executing character of
many provisions of the Treaties and of Community legislation, as well
as the "primacy" of Community law in the event of conflict, with the
laws of the Member States, had already been developed by the Court
of Justice and had already been widely accepted by the courts of the
Member States. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern the outline of
further constitutional developments in some of the provisions of the
Single European Act. In this short paper, I will seek first to sketch
briefly some of the developments that seem to follow directly from the
Act, second to discuss some developments that have occurred independently since the signature of the Act, and last to touch on some
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developments that may occur in the future under the impetus of the
Act.
I will begin with the changes introduced by the Act itself, and in
particular those affecting the four Community institutions, namely the
Council; the European Parliament, the Commission and the Court of
Justice.
From the point of view of achieving the single market, perhaps the
most significant development of the Single European Act is the introduction of majority voting in one key area. Many obstacles to trade
within the common market result from differences between the laws of
the Member States. In some cases, these obstacles could be, and were,
struck down by the Court as contrary to article 30. The scope of article 30 is broad: as interpreted by the Court, it covers "[a]ll trading
rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade. '' 3
Since article 30 has direct effect, an importer can rely on it in his national court. But article 36 provides for significant exceptions: measures affecting interstate trade can be justified under that article (if not
discriminatory or constituting disguised restrictions on trade) on a
wide variety of grounds. Those grounds are: "public morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property." Moreover, those exceptions were apparently
somewhat enlarged by the Court in the Cassis de Dijon case, where it
held that obstacles to the free movement of goods resulting from disparities between national marketing rules must be accepted insofar as
they were necessary to satisfy "mandatory requirements" relating in
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of
public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense
of the consumer. 4 The Court appears to have concluded that, provided that they were not discriminatory, measures necessary for those
purposes do not fall within the prohibition of article 30 at all.
Where measures are justified under article 36 or necessary under
the Cassis de Dijon principle, obstacles to trade can be removed only
by the harmonization of the laws of the Member States. Harmonization could be achieved by directives adopted under article 100, but
such directives could only be adopted unanimously. It should be
stressed that, even before the Single European Act, legislation could be
3. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852.
4. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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adopted in the Council by a qualified majority under other Treaty articles, but not harmonization measures under article 100. Such a measure could therefore be blocked by a single Member State, and to that
extent, the "sovereignty" of the Member States in this field was preserved. The new article 100a, introduced by the Single European Act,
was therefore of constitutional significance in providing (in paragraph
1) that such measures (with certain exceptions set out in paragraph 2)
shall be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council. Certain safeguards for the Member States are introduced, however, as explained
below. The requirement of unanimity has also been preserved for legislation in certain other fields, including fiscal harmonization.
A second constitutional development introduced by the Single European Act is an increase in the powers of the European Parliament.
Before the Treaty amendments introduced by the Act, the Parliament
had the right to be consulted before the Commission's legislative proposals were adopted by the Council, but the Parliament's role in the
legislative process ended at that point. The Act introduced a new "cooperation procedure" in many fields of legislation: here, a somewhat
complex two-stage process, giving the Parliament greater influence, is
followed. In practice, since the introduction of this procedure, many
of the Parliament's amendments to legislative proposals have been
adopted.
The Commission retains, in most areas, the sole right to initiate
legislation. In these areas, legislation can be enacted only on a proposal from the Commission. Once again, in practice, however, the result
of the introduction of majority voting in the Council is to increase the
influence of the Commission. In addition, the Single European Act
enables greater powers to be conferred on the Commission for the
adoption of implementing legislation.
The Court of Justice, retaining its role as the final interpreter of the
Treaty and of Community legislation, sees that role expanded under
the Single European Act by the jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the new provisions themselves, and on the substantial corpus of
Community legislation being enacted under the new provisions, especially under article 100a. This jurisdiction will be of a constitutional
type where the compatibility of Member State legislation with Community law is at issue. A specific new kind of jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court by article 100a(4), which permits certain safeguard measures to be adopted by a Member State where a harmonization measure
has been adopted by a qualified majority, and introduces a special
form of expedited procedure for the review of such safeguard measures
by the Court.
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It was in part in order to enable the Court of Justice "to concentrate its activities on its fundamental task of ensuring uniform interpretation of Community law" 5 that the Single European Act provided
for the establishment of a new Court of First Instance, a court with
jurisdiction to hear certain categories of cases at first instance with an
appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law. Despite its initially
rather limited jurisdiction, extending principally to antitrust cases and
to disputes between the institutions and their staff, the Court of First
Instance, established in October, 1989, is likely to have a considerable
effect on the Community's judicial system. In addition, as the preamble to the Decision of the Council establishing the Court of First Instance explains, "[I]n respect of actions requiring close examination of
complex facts, the establishment of a second court will improve the
judicial protection of individual interests."
In particular, by providing for more effective scrutiny (e.g., of the
Commission's findings of fact in antitrust cases), the Court of First
Instance may be able to contribute to the realization of an emerging
principle of European law, that all measures must be subject to effective judicial review of findings of both law and fact.
Mention of this principle leads to consideration of another aspect
of the constitutional development of the Community which, in contrast to those mentioned above, is not based on amendments to the
Treaty introduced by the Single European Act, but which has emerged
independently, if concurrently. I refer to recent developments in the
scope of judicial review - and I shall limit myself to a few significant
developments since the signature of the Single European Act but
which, it must be emphasized, are legally quite independent of it.
The first such development is judicial review of Community measures, a development which well illustrates the creative approach of the
Court to the scope of judicial review. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty,
by its terms, provides for judicial review of measures of the Council
and Commission, but in Les Verts v. European Parliament,6 the Court
had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an action for
annulment brought against the European Parliament under that article. The Court held that, despite the terms of article 173, such jurisdiction must be held to exist. It would be incompatible with the rule
of law for any of the Community institutions to take measures capable
of having legal effects if those measures were not subject to review by
the Court. As the Court put it, "[T]he European Economic Commu5. Preamble to Council Decision, 31 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 319) I (1988).
6. Parti 6cologiste 'les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
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nity is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its
Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the...
Treaty ' 7 - a Treaty which the Court, in a notable form of words,
described as the "basic constitutional charter." According to the
Court, the reason why the European Parliament was not expressly
mentioned among the institutions whose measures were subject to review under article 173 was that, in the original version of the Treaty,
the Parliament had powers of consultation and political control, but
no powers to adopt measures intended to have legal effects vis-&-vis
third parties. The Court may have had particularly in mind the new
budgetary powers conferred on the European Parliament by the budgetary treaties. The exercise of those powers by the European Parliament was itself under challenge at the time of this case, and shortly
afterwards the Court annulled the Community budget for the year in
question on the ground that the Parliament had exceeded its powers. 8
In the passage cited above, the Court refers to the need for judicial
review both of the institutions and of the Member States. At this point
it may be helpful to explain the legal basis of this form of constitutional adjudication. In the system of checks and balances, which is a
central feature of the Treaty, the counterpart to judicial review of the
Community institutions is review of the conduct of the Member States
to ensure their observance of the Treaty. This is achieved in part by
Commission proceedings under article 169 of the treaty. The Commission's use of this procedure has developed considerably over the
years, and an interesting recent feature was developed in response to a
resolution of the Parliament itself of February 9, 1983. 9 Since then
the Commission has presented to the European Parliament a report in
which the Commission provides a systematic survey of its monitoring
of the Member States' application of Community law. Since 1985,
incidentally, the Commission has included in its report a section on
decisions of the superior courts of the Member States, a section which
makes for particularly interesting reading as it reveals a wide variety
of attitudes in the various national courts, even though the general
trend is undoubtedly one of acceptance of the obligation to give effect
to Community law.
However, in the operation of the Community legal system, article
177 - enabling the Court to give preliminary rulings on references
from the courts of the Member States - has provided a mechanism
7. Id. at 1365.
8. Council of the European Communities v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 2155.
9. Resolution, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 343) 8 (1985).
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for judicial review of perhaps greater constitutional significance. The
ostensible function of article 177 is to ensure the uniform application
of Community law in all the Member States. As the Court states in
the Rheinmuhlen case, "Article 177 is essential for the preservation of
the Community character of the law established by the Treaty and has
the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in
all States of the Community." 1 0 However, while it is no doubt essential that Community law should be applied uniformly throughout the
Community, article 177 can also be regarded as embodying a dual
form of judicial review. Article 177 gives the Court jurisdiction to rule
on the interpretation of both the Treaty and Community legislation, as
well as on the validity of Community legislation. Rulings on validity
enable the Court, for example, to review the compatibility of Community legislation with general principles of law, which are reflected to
varying degrees in the constitutional and legal traditions of the Member States. Thus, the Court has exercised its article 177 jurisdiction to
rule on validity of legislation in such a way as to ensure that the legislation complies with such basic principles as the principle of proportionality, the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of
respect for fundamental rights. There is, therefore, an obvious parallel
between the review of validity under article 177 and judicial review in
direct actions under article 173. The article 177 route has the distinctive feature, however, of not being subject to the strict conditions of
access to the Court in a direct action under article 173. Thus, an individual who does not have the capacity to challenge a piece of Community legislation directly in the Court may have an alternative means of
challenge by obtaining a reference from his national court on the validity of the legislation. In this way, despite the limits imposed by the
Treaty on direct actions, the Community legal system can be regarded
as ensuring to the individual a means of obtaining judicial review of
any Community measure by which he or she is affected.
The second function of judicial review available under article 177
is the review of conduct, not of Community institutions, but of Member States themselves. This arises where a ruling on the interpretation
of Community law - as opposed to its validity - puts in issue the
compatibility of a Member State's conduct with Community law itself.
Thus, the individual who seeks to exercise some right which has been
granted by Community law but has not been transposed effectively
into national law, may be able to obtain an interpretation of the Community provision to which a national court will then give effect in the
10. RheinmUhlen-Diisseldorf v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel,
1974 E.C.R. 33, 38.
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absence of any implementing measures in the Member State and
notwithstanding any national legislation to the contrary.
Underlying this form of judicial review is the principle, now well
recognized throughout the courts of the Community, that Community
law prevails over any conflicting national law. The development of
this principle illustrates yet another function of article 177: the process of developing certain principles of a constitutional character for
which no express provision is made in the Treaties. It was by rulings
given under article 177 that the Court laid down the principle of the
primacy of Community. law in well-known cases such as Costa v.
ENEL 1 in 1964 and Simmenthal12 in 1978, even though the principle
itself may seem a necessary corollary to the need for Community law
to be uniformly applied in all Member States. It would, after all, be
illogical to suppose that the relationship between Community law and
national law should be subject, in each Member State, to different resolutions depending upon the particular arrangements made in that
state for the reception of Community law.
Perhaps the most fundamental principle developed in rulings
under article 177 is that of the direct effect of Community law, a principle first laid down in Van Gend & Loos 13 in 1963 and subsequently
developed in such a way as to apply, not only to various provisions of
the Treaty, but also to much of Community legislation. The importance of direct effect for the subject of judicial review is that it makes
the national courts responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of Community law.
When the principle of direct effect and the corollary of the primacy
of Community law are recognized by national courts, the result is the
creation of what may be regarded as constitutionally protected Community rights, prevailing within the legal systems of the Member
States over national legislation. There is thus introduced a new form
of constitutional review. It is new for those Member States which already recognized constitutional review in their internal legal systems,
because it effectively transforms that review so as to control national
measures by Community standards. It is new also for those Member
States which, like the United Kingdom, had not previously known any
form of constitutional review.
While the principles of direct effect and primacy have long standing in Community law, the full recognition of this new form of consti11.

Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.

12. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.P.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629.
13. Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 2.
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tutional review has been accepted only recently by many Member
States. I will mention two very recent illustrations, taken from the
United Kingdom and France.
In the United Kingdom it had been thought that, because of the
sovereignty of Parliament, the European Communities Act of 1972,
which gives effect to Community law in the United Kingdom, could be
overridden by a subsequent conflicting act of Parliament. However, in
the Factortamecase in 1989, it appears to have been accepted that acts
of Parliament must yield to the case-law of the European Court, and it
appears to follow from the decision of the House of Lords in that case
that any act of Parliament subsequent to the European Communities
Act must be read as subject to directly enforceable rights arising under
Community law.1 4 In France, where the supreme administrative court
(Conseil d'Etat) had taken the position that it could review administrative measures but not legislation, the decision of October 20, 1989
in the Nicolo 15 case marks a new departure. There, the Court appeared prepared to give effect to the provisions of the EEC Treaty as
overriding French legislation in the event of conflict. Taken together,
these developments in the courts of the Member States constitute full
acceptance of the principles stated by the Court of Justice on the direct
effect and primacy of Community law.
Finally, I would mention briefly two possible future developments
that may occur under the impetus of the Single European Act. One is
6
the development of the "social dimension" of the Community.' It
has sometimes been overlooked that "social law," as well as economic
law, has a place in the Community and is already reflected in a body of
social legislation. The Commission has proposed that the single market program should be accompanied by a broader "social dimension,"
and has proposed the adoption of a Community Social Charter setting
out the fundamental social rights of workers. The proposed Charter is
very wide-ranging, and in some areas, it may involve a significant ex7
tension of the Community's competence.1
A second possible development is further progress towards economic and monetary union, possibly leading ultimately to the creation
of a single European currency and to the establishment of a single
14. Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1988).
15. Nicolo, Conseil d'Etat, 1989 LEBON 108.243.
16. See Koopmans, Equal Protection- The Social Dimension ofEuropean Community Law,
11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
17. For a discussion from a U.K. perspective, see SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, THIRD REPORT, 1989, HL PAPER 6-1.
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European central bank. 8 These proposals have profound constitutional implications, but they are considered by some as necessary if a
true single market is to be attained, and if the full benefits are to be
derived from it. The proposals will also require new amendments to
the Treaty. If such amendments come about, then a new chapter on
constitutional developments in the Community will have to be written.

18. See similarly

SELECT COMMITTEE

PORT, 1989, HL PAPER 3-1.
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